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ABSTRACT 
This article takes issue with two assumptions commonly present in recent English family 
law scholarship: that the property law principles that presently apply to cohabitants’ 
property arrangements are complex and confusing, not to say inadequate, and that 
cohabitants should instead be protected by a family law-style statutory regime such as 
that proposed by the Law Commission in 2007. It argues that both the legal explanations 
and the scaremongering tone of much of this scholarship have been unhelpful (and 
sometimes inaccurate) in misleading non-specialist lawyers, but also non-lawyers and the 
general public, as to the precise nature of the respective protections offered by property 
law and family law, and that the proposed solution is not the way to tackle the real 
problem, which is not the need to protect cohabitants, but how to tackle gendered 
inequality in relationships. Instead, it suggests that legal discussions should employ more 
accuracy and precision about the law in principle and a more critical approach to how it 
works in practice (especially considering recent developments in the family courts), and 
that better conveyancing practice and better public education would help to empower 
individuals to make informed decisions as to their property arrangements. 
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This article is driven by my reaction to two assumptions so commonly present in recent 
English family law scholarship as to seem axiomatic. First, that the property law 
principles that presently apply to cohabitants’ property arrangements are too complex 
and confusing, not to say inadequate, and second, that cohabitants should be protected 
by a family law-style statutory regime such as that proposed by the Law Commission in 
2007.1 This article attempts a response, indeed a refutation of these assumptions, which 
                                                          
1 Law Commission, Cohabitation: the financial consequences of relationship breakdown. Law Com. No. 307 
(HMSO 2007) 
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have come to dominate all discussions, legal and non-legal, of cohabitation in England 
and Wales.  
 While cohabitation has been a topic of interest to both family and property 
lawyers since its demographic and legal significance were first recognised at the end of 
the 1970s,2 as we moved into the twenty-first century it became the focus of a number of 
proposals for legal intervention in the form of statutory protection of a family-law type. 
There were several drivers for this new approach, not least the introduction of similar 
protective regimes in other jurisdictions (eg British Columbia’s Family Law Act 2011), but 
a significant one was a British Social Attitudes Survey of 2000 which revealed that many 
people believed in the ‘myth of common-law marriage’ – the idea that cohabitants 
enjoyed the same legal rights as married couples.3 Follow-up research revealed that many 
people thought marriage made little difference in terms of rights.4  
The aim of this article is to examine and respond to the assumption that the law 
applicable to cohabitants is deficient for allocating shares in the family home at the end 
of a relationship, and the assumption that marriage is more protective in this situation.  
For example: 
At first sight all this [the extent of cohabitation] seems like mass irrationality, as 
marriage in Britain gives partners substantial and automatic legal benefits which 
unmarried cohabitants do not possess. It is not that cohabitants do not have any 
legal rights, but for cohabitants the law is confusing, complex, usually inferior, 
and hardly ever automatic (my emphasis).5 
 
The article focuses on the misleading presentation, in much family law literature, of the 
property law principles that regulate co-ownership, and the ways in which the virtues of 
family law are exaggerated and the drawbacks glossed over. It points out that the effect 
of the ‘marriage is good, cohabitation problematic’ mantra is not only to cause 
misunderstanding of the legal position by non-specialists but also to perpetrate a notion 
of marriage as the normal and sensible way to live and cohabitation as an abnormal and 
irrational choice because it is deficient in rights.  
                                                          
2 In 1979 the General Household Survey first included a question about cohabitation: see BJ 
Elliott, ‘Demographic trends in domestic life, 1945-87’, in D Clark (ed) Marriage, domestic life and 
social change (Routledge, 1991) at p 89. Commentaries followed: see eg A Bottomley, K Gieve, G 
Moon, G and A Weir, The cohabitation handbook (Pluto, 1981); J Eekelaar and SN Katz, Marriage 
and cohabitation in contemporary societies (Butterworths, 1981). 
3 A Barlow, S Duncan, G James and A Park, ‘Just a piece of paper? Marriage and cohabitation in 
Britain’, in A Park, J Curtice, K Thomson, L Jarvis and C Bromley (eds), British Social Attitudes: The 18th 
Report – Public policy, social ties (Sage, 2001). 
4 Eg A Barlow, S Duncan, G James and A Park, Cohabitation, marriage and the law (Hart, 2005). 
5 Ibid at p 2. 
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The article concludes with a plea for greater accuracy, balance and thought for 
the consequences of this approach to the subject and the reining in of calls for statutory 
protection for cohabitants on a family law model. The truth is that both property law 
and family law have tended to work in the interests of men, whatever the principles 
employed; and the problem, in my view, is not the lack of protection for cohabitants – 
rather, it is the need to tackle gendered inequality in relationships. Offering further 
‘protection’ is not the way to achieve this.   
Readers should bear in mind that this is an article about England and Wales, not 
marriage generally. Marriage laws, and rights associated with marriage, vary so much 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction that it is not really possible to generalise across societies. 
One of the unfortunate consequences of the unbalanced presentation of the rights of 
cohabitants and spouses in England and Wales is that non-specialists, under the 
influence of other national contexts (as represented, for example, in the media), are 
likely to make even more errors about the position here.  
One further word of caution. Not all family lawyers hold the views I criticise in 
this paper, nor, obviously, do all property lawyers agree with me. I have generalised to 
make my point, but I do want to acknowledge that, in the many opportunities I have had 
to present my ideas on this topic, I have been fortunate to have the most friendly and 
constructive feedback from a large number of family lawyers, including most of those 
named here. The article is therefore in part shaped by their engagement, for which I am 
grateful; for the rest, we have agreed to differ.6 
 
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
 
In England and Wales the marriage rate reached a peak in 1972 (60.5 for women, 78.4 for 
men) and then, in spite or possibly because of divorce law reform in 1969, began to fall; 
it has been falling ever since.7 By 2014, the Office for National Statistics reported that 
more than one-third of the adult population had never been married, a higher 
proportion than ever before in recorded history.8 Many factors have contributed to the 
                                                          
6 I would particularly like to thank Anne Barlow, Gillian Douglas, Emma Hitchings and the two 
anonymous reviewers for their helpful and extensive comments. 
7 Office for National Statistics (ONS), ‘Number of marriages, marriage rates and periods of 
occurrence’ (2011) xls (244.7 kB) 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/marriagecoha
bitationandcivilpartnerships/datasets/numberofmarriagesmarriageratesandperiodofoccurrence, 
accessed 4 October 2016. 
8 ONS, Population estimates by marital status and living arrangements: England and Wales, 2002 
to 2014 (2014) 
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decline of marriage – I have examined this in another article9 – but it is usually ascribed 
to the replacement of marriage by increasing numbers of cohabiting relationships. The 
shift was certainly dramatic: where cohabitation was virtually unknown up to the 1960s, 
today in excess of six million people cohabit (more than twice as many as twenty years 
ago).10 By 2004, observed Barlow and James, ‘the social acceptance of heterosexual 
cohabitation as a parenting and partnering structure on a par with marriage has been 
achieved almost universally’.11 
It is therefore curious that after four decades of steady decline in the rate and 
significance of marriage, marriage has now reappeared as a topic of fascination and 
concern in the academic world, with books and articles appearing on a regular basis.12 It 
is ironic, too, that at the very moment when whether you are married or not has 
mattered least, the primacy of marriage is being asserted with renewed vigour. 
 Three phenomena are to blame for this rehabilitation of marriage. The first was 
the movement for same-sex marriage which, led by campaigners in countries where 
marriage made a greater legal and financial difference to couples than it does here, 
nevertheless succeeded in convincing UK citizens that it was a privileged status from 
which lesbians and gay men were unfairly excluded. This came as a surprise to those 
homosexuals who had hitherto seen the institution as repugnant or irrelevant, and had 
the simultaneous effect of silencing objections to marriage per se since they might appear 
to be objections to equality for gays and lesbians. With the enactment of the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004, which offered same-sex couples a substantively equal status to 
marriage, we began to see the sweeping generalisations as to its legally transformative 
powers.13 It seems that many lesbians and gay men, so long denied legitimacy and 
recognition, were projecting on to marriage all their hopes and dreams, not just of 
equality with heterosexuals but of protection in law – with unfortunate results for some, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestim
ates/bulletins/populationestimatesbymaritalstatusandlivingarrangements/2015-07-08, accessed 4 
October 2016. 
9 R Auchmuty, ‘Law and the power of feminism: How marriage lost its power to oppress women’ 
(2012) 20 Feminist Legal Studies 71. 
10 Office for National Statistics, ‘Short Report: Cohabitation in the UK 2012’, p 1, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776
_284888.pdf, accessed 9 March 16. 
11 A Barlow and G James, ‘Regulating marriage and cohabitation in 21st century Britain’ (2004) 67 
MLR 143. 
12 Eg E Brake, Minimizing marriage: Marriage, morality, and the law (Oxford University Press, 2012); S 
Peterson and L McLean, Legally married: Love and law in the UK and the US (Edinburgh University Press, 
2013); M Baker and V Elizabeth, Marriage in an age of cohabitation: How and when people tie the knot in 
the twenty-first century (Oxford University Press, 2014).  
13 R Auchmuty, ‘Out of the shadows: Feminist silence and liberal law’ in C Stychin and V Munro 
(eds) Sexuality and the Law: Feminist engagements (Routledge, 2007), at p 91. 
5 
 
as it turned out.14 In the general liberal response, there was little attempt to clarify the 
exact differences that marriage (or civil partnership, which was the version we got first 
in the UK) would make to their relationships because no one wanted to burst their 
bubble. If any voices were raised in caution, they were silenced by the general rejoicing. 
The second impetus was the series of cases in the last 30 years of the twentieth 
century, at first a trickle and then a flood, in which an unmarried cohabitant, usually a 
woman, found herself after separating from her partner without any share, or a 
niggardly one, in the proceeds of sale when the home was sold. It should be noted that, 
prior to 1970, the rules had also applied to married couples who were splitting up and 
selling the home. After 1970, property was re-allocated on divorce under a completely 
different set of principles (I will outline the relevant law later) and it was these that 
family lawyers preferred. The cases on family home disputes were critically examined at 
the time by property lawyers15 whose work, with the exception of some proposals that 
England should follow other Commonwealth jurisdictions in adopting a legislative 
regime for ‘de facto’ couples,16 focused largely on judicial attitudes and approaches to the 
existing law rather than the legal and equitable rules themselves which, as subsequent 
decisions have demonstrated, are capable of more inclusive interpretation.17  
The third impetus for the rehabilitation of marriage came from the revelations of 
the British Social Attitudes Survey of 2000 about the extent of the common-law marriage 
myth, which led to an empirical study by family lawyer Anne Barlow and colleagues, 
funded by the Nuffield Foundation in 2000-2. This, and a follow-up British Social 
Attitudes Survey in 2006,18 had extraordinary impact. From this point on, cohabitation 
was no longer treated as an interesting demographic development to which the society 
and law were rapidly adjusting, but as a legal problem that needed a legal solution.  
Two rationales were offered for this new approach. First,  
It cannot be satisfactory, even just taking account of the numbers of people 
involved, for the issue of whether the law treats cohabitants as married, as similar 
                                                          
14 R Auchmuty, ‘The experience of civil partnership dissolution: Not “just like divorce”’ (2016) 38 
Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 152, at pp 168-70. 
15 A Bottomley, ‘Production of a text: Hammond v Mitchell’ (1994) 2 Feminist Legal Studies 84; R 
Auchmuty, ‘The Fiction of Equity’ in S Scott-Hunt and H Lim (eds) Feminist Perspectives on Equity and 
Trusts (Cavendish, 2001) at p 1. 
16 S Wong, ‘Property Rights for home-sharers: Equity versus a legislative framework’ in S Scott-
Hunt and H Lim (eds) Feminist Perspectives on Equity and Trusts (Cavendish, 2001) at p 133. 
17 S Gardner, ‘Problems in family property’ (2013) 72 Cambridge Law Journal 301.  
18 A Barlow, C Burgoyne, E Clery and J Smithson, ‘Cohabitation and the law: myths, money and 
the media’ in A Park, J Curtice, K Thompson, M Phillips and E Clery (eds) British Social Attitudes – the 
24th Report (2007) at p 29. 
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but still inferior to married couples, or as unrelated individuals to be nothing 
other than a legislative or judicial lottery (my emphasis).19 
 
Second, the social attitudes research showed that people were clearly not ‘legally 
rational’; that is, they did not make decisions about their lifestyle even on the clear 
evidence that marriage was better.20 Several potential remedies were identified. While 
never actually advocating that cohabitants should just get married (and without, I am 
sure, intending this), many of the ensuing publications were normative in tone, asking 
(for instance) ‘why people in Britain are increasingly cohabiting outside marriage, despite 
all the legal disadvantages to doing so?’21 and setting out the dangers of cohabiting and 
the protections offered by marriage. 
These same critiques proposed, as an alternative, a separate property regime for 
cohabitants that would incorporate some of the matrimonial law principles on the 
ending of a relationship but would not challenge the primary status of marriage. This 
idea was taken up by the Law Commission which, following its failure to come up with a 
workable solution for co-ownership disputes that respected property law’s indifference 
to gender or marital status in co-ownership,22 produced a more focused report in 2007 
dealing specifically with Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown.23 
On the reasoning that law should keep up with social change and that cohabitation was 
now functionally similar to marriage, the Law Commission recommended a legislative 
scheme for cohabitants which, though clearly different from the one available to 
married couples, yet offered family law-style protection to vulnerable ex-partners. It was 
well received, but its recommendations were not taken up in England and Wales where 
the law remains unchanged. Recent case law on the Scottish legislation (the Family Law 
(Scotland) Act 2006) has prompted renewed calls from family lawyers for an English 
equivalent,24 including one from Lady Hale in Gow v Grant,25 but these, too, have so far 
fallen on deaf ears.  
Yet another line of attack was taken by the Labour government which in 2004 
devoted £100,000 to a ‘Living Together’ campaign intended to alert cohabitants to their 
legal situation – in particular, to disabuse them of the common-law marriage myth. It 
                                                          
19 A Barlow and G James, ‘Regulating marriage and cohabitation in 21st century Britain’ (2004) 67 
MLR 143 at p 156. 
20 A Barlow, S Duncan, G James and A Park, Cohabitation, marriage and the law (Hart, 2005) at p 97. 
21 Ibid at p 47. 
22 Law Commission, Sharing Homes: A discussion paper, Law Com. No. 278 (HMSO, 2002).  
23 Law Commission, Cohabitation: the financial consequences of relationship breakdown. Law Com. No. 307 
(HMSO 2007). 
24 Eg J Miles, ‘Cohabitation: Lessons for the South from North of the Border?’ (2012) 71 CLJ 492. 
25 [2012] UKSC 29. 
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aimed to do this by presenting the legal facts so that couples could make an informed decision 
about what they should do. But it, too, could not resist going beyond mere information 
to taking a normative role. As the director of the campaign said, ‘We aren’t encouraging 
people to get married but we want cohabiting couples to protect themselves’.26  
The latest mechanism to be urged on recalcitrant cohabitants is the ‘cohabitation 
agreement’, a template for which is attached to the Living Together campaign’s website, 
Advicenow. In a masterly critique of this new strategy, Helen Reece describes the 
mechanisms by which its authors hope to influence cohabitants’ behaviour. The site 
presents cohabitation agreements as inevitably good in the same way as marriage is 
presented as inevitably good.  
Advice Now constructs this goodness in three ways: first, exaggerating how bad 
the legal position is in the absence of an agreement; second, using ‘atrocity 
tales’”; and, third, emphasizing the beneficial practical effects of agreements.27 
 
I have adopted Reece’s organising principles here. First, I will show how much the family 
law research exaggerates the deficiencies of property law. Second, I will examine and 
debunk the ‘Atrocity tales’ that it invokes in support of the critique of property law. 
Third, I will set out the ways in which the benefits of marriage are not so much 
emphasised as taken for granted and the drawbacks ignored, while the myths that have 
grown up around the superior ‘rights’ of marriage go unchallenged. Finally, I will offer a 
conclusion and proposals. 
 
EXAGGERATING THE DEFICIENCIES OF PROPERTY LAW 
 
The first problem with the ways in which the ‘marriage protects’ argument has been 
presented in the literature on family home disputes is that, seeking to evidence the 
confusing state of ‘Cohabitation Law’, proponents bundle together a broad range of 
provisions from across the legal spectrum, many of which are only relevant for a small 
minority of people, like the spousal exemption from inheritance tax.28 Though it might 
be true to say that, in many of these situations, a married person would fare better than 
a cohabitant, most of these ‘rights’ would be of little relevance to a particular individual, 
while the really big differences, as we shall see, do not automatically favour the married. 
In fact, in contrast to the US, where preferential measures for the married have 
                                                          
26 S Womack, ‘Cohabiting couples told to be aware of pitfalls’ (2004) Telegraph 15 July 2004 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1171695/posts, accessed 10 March 2016. 
27 H Reece, ‘Leaping Without Looking’ in R Leckey (ed) After Legal Equality: Family, Sex, Kinship 
(Routledge, 2015) at p 115. 
28 Eg A Barlow, S Duncan, G James and A Park, Cohabitation, marriage and the law (Hart, 2005) at p 7. 
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proliferated in the hope of incentivising cohabiting couples to marry,29 the law’s 
response in the UK has been (until very recently, at least) to do away with distinctions 
between married and unmarried people. ‘The “tenderness” shown by the law to married 
women is not based on the marriage ceremony but reflects the underlying risk of one 
cohabitee exploiting the involvement and trust of the other,’ observed Lord Browne-
Wilkinson in Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien and another.30 ‘Now that unmarried cohabitation, 
whether heterosexual or homosexual, is widespread in our society, the law should 
recognise this.’31  
 Benefits have long been assessed on a ‘household’ (rather than marital) basis (this 
saves public money and removes an impediment to marriage), illegitimacy has been 
abolished for the sake of the children, and many legal protections (for instance. from 
domestic violence and undue influence) have been extended to unmarried partners. 
Next-of-kin arrangements, tenancy succession, pensions, one by one all came to accept 
unmarried heterosexual and then same-sex partners, though not always on such 
advantageous terms.32 As Rebecca Probert points out in her study of the common-law 
marriage myth,33 it is easy to see why so many people believe in it when so many rights 
and responsibilities are similar. Socially, too, the historical pressure on women to marry 
and the economic necessity to do so were largely overcome in this period. The political 
rhetoric continued to be of commitment to marriage as the best foundation for moral 
life and children but, with illegitimacy gone and less and less significance attached to 
marital status, there was no continuing reason to penalise the unmarried.  
The biggest area of difference, and the one I want to focus on here, is what 
happens to the family home at the end of a relationship. Such a focus makes plain the 
fact that in England and Wales, unlike the United States, cohabitation is not particularly 
associated with class. In the US, poor, black and working-class couples have been found 
to be less likely to marry, with marriage linked to higher income, access to health 
benefits and a desire to protect assets.34 Perhaps because marriage offers fewer legal and 
financial advantages in the UK, the same link has not been documented here. The 
                                                          
29 L Cooke, ‘For richer, not poorer; Marriage and the growing class divide’, USNews 26 October 
2015. http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2015/10/26/marriage-and-the-growing-class-
divide, accessed 22 April 2016. 
30 [1993] 4 All ER 417, at 431. 
31 Ibid. 
32 For details, see R Auchmuty, ‘Law and the power of feminism: How marriage lost its power to 
oppress women’ (2012) 20 Feminist Legal Studies 71.  
33 R Probert, ‘The evolution of the common-law marriage myth’ (2011) 41 Family Law 283. 
34 L Cooke, ‘For richer, not poorer; Marriage and the growing class divide’, USNews 26 October 
2015. http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2015/10/26/marriage-and-the-growing-class-
divide, accessed 22 April 2016. 
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couples under discussion in the present article are all home-owners; so, given that in 
2011, 64 per cent of households in England and Wales were home-owners, representing 
a fall from a high point of 69 per cent in 2001,35 it is clear that cohabitation can be found 
across the social spectrum, including the propertied classes.  
 
The co-ownership rules in property law 
The co-ownership provisions in section 36 of the Law of Property Act 1925 are clear and 
certain, and apply to everyone, married or unmarried, family, friend or business partner. 
A couple (or anyone else for that matter) can decide how they wish to own their property 
by, for example, putting the shared home (whether owned or rented) in joint names. 
When purchasing a property, transferees have been required since 1998 to declare 
whether they wish to be joint tenants or tenants in common and, if the latter, in which 
proportions they wish to hold the property. If they choose to be joint tenants, if one 
party dies the property will pass automatically to the other, and if the property is sold, 
the proceeds will be divided between them in equal shares. If they choose to be tenants 
in common, they will have shares in the proportions chosen upon purchase; if one 
person dies, the property will pass according to their will or on intestacy; and, if sold, the 
proceeds will be divided in the agreed proportions. A joint tenancy can be converted into 
a tenancy in common (’severance’) under section 36 or informally as a consequence of 
certain actions identified in Williams v Hensman;36 but, if that happens, then the share 
taken will be the proportion that would have been available on sale – that is, if there are 
two owners and one severs, each has half. 
That is all that cohabitants purchasing property together need to know; and a 
competent conveyancer should ensure that they understand so that they make an 
informed decision at this stage. If conveyancers sometimes do not so insist, a point to 
which I shall return, that it not the fault of the law but of standards of conveyancing. 
The solution is of course to make the declaration mandatory, a far simpler legal 
intervention than introducing a new property regime for cohabitants.  
Where the law of England and Wales is unusual, certainly, is that co-ownership 
takes place under a trust. Though odd, this is not especially significant: in 99 cases out of 
100, the legal owners will simply hold the property on trust for themselves. Legal 
                                                          
35 Office for National Statistics, A Century of Home Ownership and Renting in England and Wales 
(HMSO, 2013) 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/
2011-census-analysis/a-century-of-home-ownership-and-renting-in-england-and-wales/short-story-
on-housing.html, accessed 21 April 2016. 
36 (1861) 1 John and H 546.  
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ownership is recorded on the documents of title but it is the beneficial ownership that 
determines shares. Goodman v Gallant37 is authority for two propositions: one, that if the 
conveyance explicitly states that the owners are to hold the property as joint tenants in 
law and equity then this declaration is conclusive unless the joint tenancy is 
subsequently severed, and, two, that upon severance, shares will be divided equally 
among the co-owners. That the shares cannot be varied on sale will, of course, be 
problematic for claimants who believe (perhaps because they have contributed more, as 
Mrs Goodman did) that they deserve a greater proportion. Although there has been 
considerable litigation on this point, the lesson of Goodman v Gallant is that the 
declaration will be determinative, relegating the constructive trust to a marginal status 
as a remedy in disputes where either the beneficial shares have not been declared or 
where a person is claiming a share against a sole legal owner. Simon Gardner, however, 
contends that Goodman v Gallant is only authority for claims in existence at the time of 
the declaration (for instance, where one person contributed more to the purchase price); 
subsequent claims, for example on the basis of higher mortgage repayments after 
purchase, could in his view be invoked to displace the original declaration.38 There is no 
case law to demonstrate this and, as Gardner himself concedes, the original declaration, 
if made by parties fully informed as to its meaning and consequences, could well be seen 
as the cohabitants’ equivalent of a pre-nuptial agreement and thus intended to be 
binding.39  
 The commonest use of the constructive trust is in situations where the property is 
in the sole legal ownership of one cohabitant and the other claims a share of the 
beneficial ownership. Sole ownership of the family home was once the norm; up to the 
1980s homes were normally conveyed into the husband’s name alone. This was because 
men were supposed to provide for their families and lenders were reluctant to lend to 
women on the ground that they would leave the paid workforce (where in any case they 
were paid less than men) on marriage or maternity so would have no money to pay the 
mortgage instalments. So a woman whose name was not on the conveyance and who 
wanted to claim a share on separation would have had to resort to implied trusts. The 
criteria for obtaining this equitable remedy, developed in case law over the past 70 years, 
are now fairly settled, and its use has declined since couples living in sole-owned homes 
are the exception rather than the rule.  
                                                          
37 [1986] Fam 106. 
38 S Gardner, ‘Understanding Goodman v Gallant’ (2015) 5 Conv 199. 
39 Ibid p 208. 
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 Jointly-occupied homes are no longer routinely conveyed into the man’s name. 
Not only are lenders unable to discriminate against women but, since the landmark case 
of Williams & Glyn’s Bank v Boland,40 they have required – for their own protection, it must 
be said, not the woman’s – that homes bought by and for couples be conveyed into joint 
names. A significant movement in the 1960s and 1970s to introduce obligatory joint 
ownership of the matrimonial home failed precisely because, as Stephen Cretney 
recounts, joint conveyancing to husband and wife had become ‘almost universal’ by the 
time the Law Commission drafted a suitable Bill.41  This means that the problem of the 
sole legal owner has all but disappeared. Philipp Lersch and Sergi Vidal analysed British 
Household Panel Surveys from 1992 to 2008 and the UK Longitudinal Study of 2010-11 to 
see how many couples jointly owned the family home and how many lived in a home 
owned by one of the parties only. They found that the great majority of homes, 
especially of younger couples, were jointly owned. Only 13 per cent of couples’ homes 
across the period 1992-2011 were in the sole ownership of one of the parties, and this 
was usually the result of a conscious decision by someone who had children by a former 
partner and who wished to preserve inheritance rights for them.42 
 It remains true that a person who moves in with a partner who already owns his 
or her own home could end up having to claim a share under an implied trust if the 
relationship ends. These days, however, re-mortgaging or moving to a new property – 
common events in long-term relationships – will trigger conveyance into joint names,43 
thus, again, reducing the incidence of sole ownership. 
 
Co-ownership as often represented in family law accounts 
The above section presents the law of co-ownership as understood by property lawyers. 
This is not, however, the way we find it presented in many accounts by family lawyers. 
Here is an example:  
The legal position of spouses and cohabitants diverges substantially, however, at 
the point of relationship breakdown. While both may apply for the court-based 
remedy of tenancy transfer, only spouses have access to a more general 
jurisdiction which enables the discretionary redistribution of income and capital 
                                                          
40 [1981] AC 487. 
41 S Cretney, Family Law in the Twentieth Century: A history (Oxford University Press, 2003) at p 140. 
42 P Lersch and S Vidal, ‘My House or our Home? Entry into sole ownership in British couples’ 
(Universitat Pompeu Fabia Demography Society Working Paper No 2015 – 57) at p 13. 
43 That this has long been normal practice among cohabitants was demonstrated by J Burgoyne, 
‘Does the ring make any difference? Couples and the private face of a public relationship’ in D 
Clark ed. Marriage, Domestic Life and Social Change: writings for Jacqueline Burgoyne (Routledge, 1984) at 
p 251 
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resources, present and future. … Cohabitants, by contrast, are left with whatever 
the law of property and trust entitles them to … (my emphasis).44 
 
The tone of this extract, no less than its content, presents a view of property law as both 
inadequate in itself and inferior to family law. Of course the authors are right that 
financial provision on divorce is more extensive than in property law, encompassing 
income, pensions and other capital assets as well as the home, while property law will 
only deal with the home. But the home is usually the couple’s main asset so this 
statement creates a misleading impression if readers assume, as many will, that the 
separating cohabitant will get very little. In fact, as these authors point out three pages 
later, the chances are that the property will be jointly owned in law and equity; if so, the 
claimant will get half. But by the time the reader gets to this sentence, s/he will have 
absorbed the message that cohabitation is legally problematic and marriage is better.  
In contrast, a wife’s entitlement under divorce law is unclear. She might get half 
(or more) but then again, if her spouse has greater needs and fewer resources than she 
has, she might get less.  Let us imagine the above statement rephrased to reflect this: 
The legal position of spouses and cohabitants diverges substantially, however, at 
the point of relationship breakdown. Only cohabitants can be confident that their 
intentions, as embodied in an agreement at the point of purchase as to the extent 
and nature of their respective interests in property, will be honoured and cannot 
be challenged. Spouses, by contrast, will be left with the uncertainty of a remedy 
which is discretionary in nature, unclear in principle, and unpredictable in 
application. They might get what was agreed, or more, or less – it is impossible to 
be sure. 
 
Does this give a different impression? Yet this is just as true as the Miles and Probert 
account, only from a property lawyer’s perspective – and just as misleading. Of course 
family law is not usually so arbitrary; in most financial remedy cases, where the available 
funds are small, the needs of the parties will determine the outcome, with housing 
children the paramount consideration. My point is that, in the great majority of 
cohabitation situations, the parties will be joint tenants and will get half each on the sale 
of the family home. This might not be as much as they might get on divorce (but if one 
gets more, the other will obviously get less), but it is still a substantial and certain share, 
A second way in which family lawyers convey the idea that property law is 
inadequate is by focusing, not on the normal, everyday co-ownership situations, but on 
the exceptional areas of reported case law. Such is the approach in Cohabitation, Marriage 
and the Law by Barlow, Duncan, James and Park, perhaps the most influential work in this 
field. Instead of explaining co-ownership in terms of section 36 of the Law of Property 
                                                          
44 J Miles and R Probert (eds) Sharing Lives, Dividing Assets: an inter-disciplinary study (Hart, 2009) at p 5. 
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Act, they launch straight into the situation ‘[w]here one or both cohabiting partners are 
(or claim to be) beneficial owners of the family home but no formal declaration of those 
interests has been made’.45 As we have seen, single ownership of the family home was 
once common but today is much less so; joint ownership without a record of shares 
persists, but the general rule is that equity follows the law, so joint ownership in law will 
normally give rise to joint ownership of the beneficial ownership. But readers unfamiliar 
with the law will come away thinking that, while the homemaker wife will usually 
emerge from a divorce with ‘at least half of the assets’, ‘the cohabitant will (always) have 
to prove an interest under a constructive trust’,46 the implication being that she may 
come away with nothing. In fact, most cohabitants of jointly-owned homes take one-half 
without having to prove anything, while the case law is replete with examples of non-
owner cohabitants who succeeded in winning a share under a constructive trust, such as 
Grant v Edwards,47 where the claimant had made no financial contributions to the 
property at all, yet the court was able to develop established principles of equity to 
ensure she received justice. 
An even more weighted statement appears in the section on ‘Cohabitants and the 
law’ in Barlow et al’s article of 2007: 
Rented tenancies of the family home aside, there is no divorce equivalent for 
cohabitants, who are dependent on strict and complex property law rather than 
family law based on principles of ‘fairness’ to resolve their disputes concerning 
the owner-occupied family home or other property (my emphasis).48 
  
And here is a similar claim, this time concerning rights of occupation: 
Whereas spouses on marriage automatically acquire occupation rights in the 
family home owned by their spouse, no such occupation rights are extended to 
cohabitants of either a rented or owner-occupied home.49  
 
True enough if you are not a co-owner, but you probably are! – and co-owners, like 
spouses, have automatic rights of occupation. 
The message non-specialists take from these pronouncements is that the rules 
applying to homes co-owned by cohabitants are both complex and unfair, unlike family 
law which (we are told) is explicitly ‘fair’. In truth, however, the formal joint ownership 
                                                          
45 A Barlow, S Duncan, G James and A Park, Cohabitation, marriage and the law (Hart, 2005) at p 9. 
46 Ibid at p 10. 
47 [1986] 2 All ER 426. 
48 A Barlow, C Burgoyne, E Clery and J Smithson, ‘Cohabitation and the law: myths, money and 
the media’ in A Park, J Curtice, K Thompson, M Phillips and E Clery (eds) British Social Attitudes – the 
24th Report, (2007) at p 40. 
49 A Barlow and G James, ‘Regulating marriage and cohabitation in 21st century Britain’ (2004) 67 
MLR 147. 
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rules of section 36 are strict – which means they are certain – but they are not 
particularly complex, whereas the rules that apply in the situation described here, where 
a cohabitant is claiming a share in her partner’s property, are indeed complex, but not 
strict; being based on equity, a jurisdiction whose very name means ‘fairness’, they are 
actually quite flexible.   
In a fourth example, research undertaken by Gillian Douglas, Julia Pearce and 
Hilary Woodward50 looked at what happened to the property of 24 formerly cohabiting 
couples in the light of Lady Hale’s list of factors to be taken into account in quantifying 
shares in the family home in the case of Stack v Dowden.51 Because they were putting 
Hale’s criteria to the test, the authors gave the impression that all joint ownership 
cohabitation separations would be dealt with this way. Stack v Dowden concerned a couple 
whose property was held in a joint tenancy but the beneficial shares had not been 
declared, which was the situation for some but not all of Douglas et al’s interviewees. 
Since the introduction in 1998 of the form requiring declaration, however, and assuming 
that the requirement is complied with, there should be fewer and fewer couples in this 
position as the years go by. Moreover, the couples interviewed by Douglas et al were all 
in dispute with each other; all had sought legal advice, and several had gone to court. 
The great majority of cohabitants will not have to seek legal advice or go to court; they 
will simply sell the property and take the share they expected and agreed at the outset 
and go their separate ways.  
 
Discussion 
The way in which these family lawyers represent property law prompts a number of 
reactions from the property law perspective. First, there are clearly drawbacks to the 
property law approach: decisions made at the start of a relationship may not reflect 
needs or indeed fairness at the end, which is the focus of family law; and property law is 
limited to ownership of land, so that only landowners and land are encompassed in its 
remit and it cannot deal with pensions and other assets. All this I freely admit. Within 
these limits, however, property law does not serve couples as ill as many family lawyers 
suggest.   
                                                          
50 G Douglas, J Pearce and H Woodward, ‘Cohabitation and conveyancing practice: Problems and 
solutions’ (2008) 72 Conveyancer 365; G Douglas, J Pearce and H Woodward, ‘Money, property, 
cohabitation and separation’ in J Miles and R Probert (eds) Sharing Lives, Dividing Assets: an inter-
disciplinary study (Hart, 2009) at p 139. 
51 [2007] 2 AC 432. 
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The family lawyers I have cited make a great deal of the fact that the requirement 
for co-owners to declare shares in property at the outset is not enforced. Because the 
shares in cases like Stack v Dowden and Jones v Kernott52 were not declared (in both cases 
the property in question was bought before the requirement was introduced), and 
because Douglas and her colleagues found in their empirical study that it was still not 
being observed by many conveyancers, their critique appears to proceed from the notion 
that the rule does not exist. But not enforcing a rule is quite different from not having a 
rule; the rule that shares should be declared exists, and has existed since 1925, and the 
form TR1 was introduced to make it obligatory. If the rule is still not being complied 
with, that is not the fault of property law, which works perfectly well for those who do 
observe the rules and are happy with the shares declared on purchase.  
It follows that what these family lawyers see as the essential property law rules is 
quite different from what property lawyers see. This realisation came to me when one of 
my family lawyer readers objected, having reached this point in the article, that I had 
not actually summarised property law. Yet this was precisely what I thought I had done 
when outlining the rules in section 36 of the Law of Property Act (I have inserted a sub-
heading now to make the point). For property lawyers, then, the co-ownership rules are 
contained in section 36 (together with the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees 
Act 1996, dealing with the powers of trustees and beneficiaries and procedures for sale), 
not in the constructive trust emphasised by these family lawyers.  
It is true that I have not set out the constructive trust rules. This is not just 
because they are both numerically and conceptually the exception, not the norm: co-
owned property was intended by the Law of Property Act 1925 to be held in joint names, 
with declared beneficial ownership; and it is now generally held in joint names.53 But the 
other reason for not focusing on them is that the constructive trust is a remedy, whereas 
section 36 establishes rights. Thousands of co-ownership transactions take place every 
week, of which only a tiny proportion will ever require the intervention of a court upon 
subsequent sale. Given that couples living in sole-owned homes are now such a small 
percentage of home-owners, and many cases intentionally so, if the TR1 form were 
always filled out upon purchase we would hardly ever see a constructive case.  
I am aware, as family lawyers are, that many individuals are not equally 
empowered within the relationship to make free rational choices. Rather than call for 
judicial protection, however, I view the ordinary property law rules and procedures as 
                                                          
52 [2011] UKSC 53. 
53 The problem was that the patriarchal framers of the LRA 1925 never dreamt that wives would 
ever be co-owners, let alone cohabitants. 
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automatically beneficial to such individuals, since the starting point in statutory co-
ownership is the joint tenancy, which gives rise to equal shares on sale. This is the 
central principle of formal co-ownership law, and the constructive trust is really only an 
exception invoked to deal with the difficulties caused by the historically specific practice 
of conveying the family home into the husband’s sole name, and later with the errors 
and omissions of conveyancers who failed to explain the ramifications of a joint tenancy 
or to declare beneficial shares. And let’s not dismiss its past helpfulness: in spite of a 
chequered history, the constructive trust has enabled many claimants, mostly women, to 
acquire an interest in the family home through informal means. Today, as Gardner 
observes, ‘The trust rules display a commitment to taking material communality, where 
it exists, seriously: that is, to following the parties’ own choice to pooling their resources, 
rather than keeping separate accounts’.54 Exactly like family law. 
 
ATROCITY TALES 
In its efforts to persuade unmarried couples to draw up cohabitation agreements, the 
Advicenow site55 offered a series of imaginary case studies of unfortunate individuals 
who, believing they had rights as cohabitants, or simply trusting to luck or their partner, 
were sadly disillusioned when the relationship ended. The family law critics of property 
law have never had to invent such case studies as they had the ideal atrocity tale to hand 
in that of Mrs Burns, the claimant in Burns v Burns,56 who walked away with nothing after 
19 years of being an ideal common-law wife and mother. Mrs Burns pops up everywhere 
in family law descriptions of the way cohabitants are treated in property law. In their 
book Cohabitation, Marriage and the Law, for example, Barlow et al illustrate their account 
of co-ownership law by reference to ‘the classic case of Burns v Burns’.57 So does the Law 
Commission Report on Cohabitation, using the very same words.58 In an article of 2012, Jo 
Miles was still referring to ‘the totemic Mrs Burns’.59 Yet the facts of this case took place 
four decades ago and, as Anne Bottomley pointed out ten years ago, neither the law as 
                                                          
54 S Gardner, ‘Problems in family property’ (2013) 72 CLJ 301 at p 311. 
55 Advicenow, How to make a Living Together Agreement (2016)  
http://www.advicenow.org.uk/guides/how-make-living-together-agreement, accessed 10 March 
2016. 
56 [1984] Ch 317. 
57 A Barlow, S Duncan, G James and A Park, Cohabitation, marriage and the law (Hart, 2005) at p 9. 
58 Law Commission, Cohabitation: the financial consequences of relationship breakdown. Law Com. No. 307 
(HMSO 2007) p 21 footnote 27. 
59 J Miles, ‘Cohabitation: Lessons for the South from North of the Border?’ (2012) 71 CLJ 492.  
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applied to Mrs Burns nor the woman herself represents the norm today.60 Even if some 
Mrs Burnses remain, this is hardly sufficient rationale for such a wholesale revision of 
the law, especially as the problem is so clearly on the decline. 
Barlow and Miles contend that Burns v Burns is still ‘good law’. This is only true in 
a narrow sense: contributions to housework and childcare per se still do not entitle a 
person to a share in the home. But it is very unlikely that the case would be decided ‘the 
same today as it was 30 years ago’, as Miles claims.61 The law has moved on, as Lord 
Walker remarked in Stack v Dowden.62 Intention to co-own, he explained, is now 
established by taking ‘account of all significant contributions, direct or indirect, in cash 
or in kind’.63 And in quantifying the shares, attention will be given to ‘the whole course 
of dealings between the parties in relation to the property’.64 Using the modern tests, 
Mrs Burns would almost certainly get something; indeed, Gardner thinks she might be 
entitled to as much as 50 per cent in a court today.65 This is not to deny that she might 
have fared better in the family court. My point is simply that it is wrong to suggest she 
would still get nothing. 
The family law accounts also, as Bottomley pointed out, misrepresent the actual 
sociological situation by focusing on a stereotype (of which Mrs Burns is the exemplar) 
who even ten years ago was no longer typical of female cohabitants, and is now almost 
unknown: the homemaker dependant who brings no financial contribution to the 
property. Most cohabitants, as Ruth Deech observes, will have put some money into the 
home because practically all propertied women are or have been in paid work; they will 
thereby acquire an interest.66 Bottomley instances Mrs Oxley of Oxley v Hiscock as a more 
modern female cohabitant; I would point to Ms Dowden of Stack v Dowden.67 Unlike Mrs 
Burns, who came into the relationship and the shared home with nothing, both Mrs 
Oxley and Ms Dowden already had more property and were in a stronger financial 
position than their male partners. If Ms Dowden needed the law’s protection, it was to 
stop her ex-partner from taking more than his fair share of the proceeds of sale. The 
same was true of Ms Jones in Jones v Kernott.68 And let’s not forget: both Ms Dowden and 
                                                          
60 A Bottomley, ‘From Mrs. Burns to Mrs. Oxley: Do co-habiting women (still) need marriage law?’ 
(2006) 14 Feminist Legal Studies 181 at p 194. 
61 J Miles, ‘Cohabitation: Lessons for the South from North of the Border?’ (2012) 71 CLJ 492. 
62 [2007] 2 AC 432 at para 26. 
63 Ibid, para 31. 
64 Oxley v Hiscock [2005] Fam 211, at p 246. 
65 S Gardner, ‘Problems in family property’ (2013) 72 CLJ 301 at p 305. 
66 R Deech, ‘What’s a woman worth?’ (2009) 39 Family Law 1140 at p 1141. 
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Ms Jones got the court’s protection; they were awarded the share they deserved, and 
might not have fared so well in a divorce court. Where Mr Stack, at least, could have 
presented himself as having fewer resources.  
Atrocity tales, although by their nature exceptional, tend to be generalised across 
every cohabiting situation and thus strike fear into the hearts of all cohabitants who read 
about them (and who remember them even when the actual details of law have been 
forgotten). This is, of course, the purpose for which they are used. As Bottomley 
observed, the image of Mrs Burns ‘stands as a strong warning to women of the dangers 
of cohabitation’.69 I respectfully suggest that it is time family lawyers stopped recycling 
the tale of Mrs Burns and started stating the law as it is experienced by the great 
majority of property-owning cohabitants. 
 
EXAGGERATING THE BENEFITS OF MARRIAGE 
‘The benevolent model of extending the protection of family law to cohabitants,’ wrote 
Anne Bottomley in her 2006 article, ‘is premised on an assumption that not only does 
property law fail women, but that family law does not’ (my emphasis).70 This section 
deals with the law’s provisions for property allocation on divorce, which are only 
available to spouses and civil partners: it is not a critique of marriage per se. The court has 
an unlimited discretion under section 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act (MCA) 1973 to re-
allocate property between parties on divorce. This now extends to same-sex marriages 
under section 11 of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 and similar provisions 
apply to civil partners under section 66 and Schedule 5 Part 5 of the Civil Partnership Act 
2004. Property adjustment orders include the court’s ability to transfer the property to 
the other partner or to order the sale of the property and division of the proceeds. (Other 
orders are also available concerning spousal maintenance, share of pension benefits, etc, 
which are not available to cohabitants.) Section 25 MCA 1973 gives guidance to the court 
as to how and whether to exercise its discretion. First consideration is given to the 
welfare of any children. After that, what is noteworthy about the list is that it includes 
factors which are not taken into account in assessing interests under an implied trust, 
such as the parties’ needs and resources and contributions to the welfare of the family, 
including housework and childcare. 
 This all sounds good, and was in fact the result of vigorous campaigning by 
feminists at the time of the passing of the Divorce Reform Act 1969, which permitted 
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70 Ibid at p 207. 
19 
 
men for the first time to divorce their blameless wives against their will.71 The women 
argued that, without these provisions and the possibility of capital transfers, many older 
ex-wives, long out of the workplace if they had ever been there, would be left without 
sufficient resources to make a new life for themselves. Section 25 recognised both the 
importance of the wife and mother’s contribution to the marriage and the difficult 
situation these discarded women were in. Important as these provisions are, however, 
there is no denying that they belong to a different era – an era in which men were 
expected to be the main breadwinner in families and wives and mothers had broken and 
lower-paid (or no) experience of paid employment, and when divorce was still rare. Case 
law has developed the principles in step with social change over the succeeding decades, 
just as constructive trust case law has, but there remain substantial limitations to family 
law’s ability to protect women on divorce. 
 
(a) The law of financial remedies is discretionary. 
Unlike co-ownership in property law, where in the great majority of cases the shares the 
parties declare on acquisition will automatically be the shares they get on disposal and 
the courts will not be involved, all divorce settlements must be negotiated. It is true that 
in situations where a cohabitant is claiming an interest under an implied trust in her ex-
partner’s property, or where a co-owner is challenging the presumption of equal shares 
on sale because no shares had been declared on acquisition, the claimant will find him- 
or herself in the discretionary territory of equitable remedies and will have to go to 
court. But wherein does this differ from the family court’s discretion under section 24? 
Rights in both courts are discretionary rather than automatic and clear rules and 
principles must be applied in both. Moreover, given that the resulting trust (which only 
looks at contributions at the point of purchase) has been abandoned in family home 
disputes in favour of the constructive trust (which can take account of subsequent 
contributions and detriment suffered), property court judges, just like family law judges, 
have some possibility of surveying the whole course of dealings between the couple in 
relation to the property.72 
 
(b) The interpretive principles are confused and unpredictable. 
A common criticism of the financial relief provisions is the lack of clear principle 
emerging from recent case law as to how section 25 should be applied. Needs are dealt 
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with first, and these often exhaust the assets. From White v White73 came the equal sharing 
principle which was to come into play if and when needs have been met. Miller; 
McFarlane74 saw the introduction of the idea of compensation for disadvantage and 
opportunities lost because of the marriage. These principles are often in conflict; as 
Deech comments: 
The judges, with their best efforts, have not been able to make the law certain 
enough in application to avoid lengthy litigation and negotiation between the 
parties which obviously blocks the process of moving on from the divorce and 
increases the stress and expense. Indeed, judgments pile new principle on new 
principle and move further away from the statutory law.75  
 
John Eekelaar described the judgment in Miller as a ‘descent into chaos’76 while Rebecca 
Bailey-Harris declared: 
It is impossible to predict when an articulated statutory principle will be seized 
upon in a judgement, or when a new sub-principle will be invented, or when the 
search for principle will simply be disclaimed.77 
 
Alison Diduck traced three shifts of approach to financial remedies over the past twenty 
years from ‘a language of paternalism’, through one of ‘equality/rights’ and sharing, to a 
new focus on ‘individualism, autonomy and choice’. None of these, she suggested, works 
well for women, simply because the judges pick and choose from a set of established 
narratives in ways that allow them to reproduce traditional models of family 
organisation.78 The effect of this chopping and changing is to ensure that, whatever the 
principle adopted, men still do better on divorce and women’s disadvantage persists for 
years.79 
 
(c) Practice is not uniform. 
While there is usually little room for manoeuvre in everyday small-money cases, 
nevertheless practice can vary from court to court, as Emma Hitchings found in her 
small empirical study of three areas. She quoted one solicitor who spoke of a place 
where one district judge was ‘excellent, consistent, courteous and thoughtful’ and the 
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other was ‘absolutely mad. So it’s a complete lottery’. Another told her that some judges 
are ‘pro-wife’ and some ‘pro-husband’.80 The National Chair of Resolution, the 
organisation of family lawyers committed to non-confrontational divorce, in an article 
entitled ‘Let’s Play Ancillary Relief’ likened the process to a ‘gambling game’.81 These 
observations were taken seriously enough by the Law Commission to make lack of 
uniform application one of their reasons for calling for action on Matrimonial Property 
in their 2014 report.82 
 
(d) There is rarely enough money to go round, let alone for a remedy. 
The big-money cases that get all the media attention are of little use to the great majority 
of divorcing couples, where the available means are barely enough to meet the parties’ 
needs, or not even that.83 The consequence is that the protective capabilities of family 
law are more limited than some family law accounts suggest, and may be no better than 
those of property law where the home is jointly owned. 
 
(e) Most divorces today do not go before a judge. 
Not only is there insufficient money to meet the parties’ needs in many cases, most 
divorcing couples today do not have their financial settlements made by a judge; indeed, 
as the Law Commission on Matrimonial Property observed, if they all had to, ‘the court 
system would be unable to cope’.84 Solicitor negotiation and informal discussion are the 
two most commonly reported methods of achieving settlement85 and, with the near-
demise of Legal Aid, many litigants have no legal advice at all. Judges still need to 
approve pension orders, but property settlements can be agreed outside the court. 
Indeed, one of the solicitors interviewed by Hitchings and her team said that co-
ownership disputes under property law provisions were more likely to go to a hearing 
‘because it can be black and white [section 15 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of 
Trustees Act 1996 states that a sale will be ordered simply if the purpose of the co-
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ownership has ended], whereas in ancillary relief you’ve got to decide which shade of 
grey you’re on’.86  
 
(f) Divorce settlements require agreement. 
Each of the above forms of reaching agreement has been subject to vigorous criticism, 
largely on the ground of inequality of bargaining power between the parties but also 
because many of these specialised services do not offer legal information and cannot 
offer legal advice. Their goal is to reach agreement, and this must sometimes cause the 
less strident party, aware or unaware of their rights, or simply desperate to end the 
relationship, to give in or give up.  
 
(g) Divorce is expensive.   
Family law critics are quick to say that bringing a case in property law is expensive (as it 
is) but, as I have shown, most property divisions by cohabitants take place without legal 
intervention and only disputes will go to court. This is also true of many financial 
remedy cases, especially with the curtailment of Legal Aid; but there are still 
considerable administrative costs for divorce. In carrying out my research into civil 
partnership dissolution, I found that many respondents were outraged at the cost of 
dissolution, even when uncontested, in comparison with the cost of entering into a civil 
partnership or marriage.87 Contested divorce cases often eat up all the assets, with a 
recent article stating that costs have ‘spun out of control’.88  
 
(h) The process can be deeply unpleasant.  
Our divorce law betrays its origins as a compromise between church and state in the 
1960s. Rather than adopting a no-fault approach, it retained fault-based principles that 
can play out very nastily not only in justifying the divorce itself but also in the property 
negotiations. As Deech puts it: 
Modern financial provision law has substituted for the old public divorce hearing an 
equally unpleasant inquisitorial procedure designed to establish the husband’s 
financial position and rivals the old law in its depth, length, cost, temptation to lie 
and humiliation ….89 
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The absence of a legal process for ending a cohabiting relationship means that couples 
need not endure this additional aggravation. 
 
(i) It is wrong to say that marriage protects couples. What it protects is protects 
vulnerable individuals within couples. 
Perhaps the most egregious misrepresentation of the law lies in the careless use of the 
word ‘couples’ or ‘partners’ in relation to the law’s protection. Divorce law does not, as is 
often claimed, protect couples or partners; it protects only the financially vulnerable party 
to the marriage, and only to the extent that his or her ex-spouse can afford to pay. It 
follows that the assets of the party in a stronger financial position will not be protected; 
rather, their assets may be taken away.  When Barlow et al wondered ‘why people in 
Britain are increasingly cohabiting outside marriage despite all the legal disadvantages to 
doing so?’90 they begged the question of ‘Advantageous for whom?’ Not for the man who 
seeks to ensure that his partner cannot get her hands on his assets. Not for the woman 
who wants to keep her boyfriend’s name off her child’s birth certificate or to avoid 
having to support a financially irresponsible partner. All the generalised talk of ‘couples’ 
or ‘yourself and your partner’ obscures the fact that financial protection for one party 
involves financial loss for the other. And if there are no assets, there is no protection.  
 
(j) Marriage institutionalises dependency. 
Once this is grasped, it becomes clear that family law expects that there will be 
substantial differences of financial power within the marriage and that, without this 
protective law, the stronger party is likely to abuse his power. Our divorce law, 
essentially unchanged since 1969 when wives really were dependent and vulnerable on 
divorce, is premised on a model of economic dominance and dependence which is clearly 
out of step with today’s more usual and approved model of equality.91 Indeed, the very 
way we speak about the ‘protections’ of marriage betrays our assumption that marriage 
relationships will be unequal. Our law assumes that, thanks to the very nature of the marriage 
relationship, there will be someone whom the courts need to protect.  
While there is some truth in the claim that gendered dependency is a function of 
intimate relationships generally, not just of marriage, particularly where there are 
children, the dependency that I am referring to is something different: it is the 
assumption that, because this form of relationship was once universal in marriage, 
                                                          
90 A Barlow, S Duncan, G James and A Park, Cohabitation, marriage and the law (Hart, 2005) at p 47. 
91 A Diduck, ‘What is family law for?’ (2011) 64 Current Legal Problems 287 at p 293. 
24 
 
family law should still treat every marriage this way. A law framed this way may 
encourage women not to bother to retain a measure of financial independence or to 
negotiate a more egalitarian spread of domestic responsibilities when they marry; it may 
even persuade them to choose dependence in the expectation that the law will protect 
them if it goes wrong.  
Surely agreements made by the parties themselves (properly informed, and 
preferably empowered) are better than a passive reliance on the power of family law to 
sort things out. Ten years ago Bottomley expressed disquiet at the prospect of a statutory 
regime for cohabitants precisely for this reason: ‘What is worrying is the possibility that 
any extension of family law in these circumstances might well lead women like Mrs. 
Oxley to take even fewer steps to protect their position’.92  
 
(k) There are even more myths about marriage than there are about ‘common-
law marriage’  
First, a word about that ‘common-law marriage myth’. It is not a total myth. Marital 
status is irrelevant in most areas of English law and there is no reason to believe that, 
when the BSA Survey asked people whether they thought cohabitants had the same 
rights as married people, they had their rights on separation in mind. In most of their 
day-to-day activities married and unmarried people will indeed be treated the same and 
all the evidence shows that the last thing couples want to think about is breaking up.93 
What the surveys did reveal was that, when presented with imaginary scenarios, what 
interviewees thought the law should be was often quite different from what it actually is. 
But the research methodology did not reveal whether these people in fact knew what the 
law was; they were simply asked for what they thought was ‘the best way’ to deal with a 
situation.94  
 Given that most of those who hear (and believe) that marriage is more protective 
than cohabitation have little idea in what specific ways, it is hardly surprising that the 
vacuum of ignorance gets filled with all sorts of ideas and expectations, some true, some 
not. Pascoe Pleasence and Nigel Balmer set out to discover just what the public did 
understand, and found that large proportions of respondents held misconceptions about 
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both cohabitation and marriage. Fifty-two per cent incorrectly believed that on 
separation after ten years a homemaker cohabitant had a good claim for financial 
support from her partner. But 35 per cent believed that a homemaker spouse would not 
have a good claim, which is just as incorrect. Misunderstandings of entitlement on 
intestacy were worse: only 14 per cent thought (wrongly) that a cohabitant would 
automatically inherit a share of a deceased partner’s property after ten years, but a full 
48 per cent thought (equally wrongly) that a spouse would not.95  
 The Law Commission report on Matrimonial Property noted a number of myths 
of marriage,96 of which the most common is the idea that in marriage the spouses share 
property 50:50. ‘In my experience,’ wrote Bottomley, ‘many married women think that 
the fact of marriage gives them equal rights to property’.97 In fact, property ownership is 
determined by property law during the subsistence of a marriage, meaning that spouses 
have no rights to the other’s property while still married on divorce, however, the court 
is able to grant such rights. Douglas, Pearce and Woodward commented on the mistaken 
belief of cohabiting couples that they acquired rights of some sort to their partner’s 
property98 but they did not explain that, in fact, spouses do not, either. The public 
misunderstanding may be due to careless reporting of the equal-sharing principle of 
White v White99 or perhaps confusion with the ‘community of property’ regimes that 
operate in most continental and some American jurisdictions, under which marital 
property is shared equally between the spouses. What is more likely than either of these 
explanations, I submit, is that people assume joint ownership of family property because 
they have chosen to have their family home conveyed to them as joint tenants in law 
and equity. In this situation, usual for most committed couples whether married or 
cohabiting, equal ownership (of the home, at least) is not a myth at all but the reality 
while the relationship subsists. 
 
Discussion 
This article has argued that the problems associated with cohabitation have been 
exaggerated, as have the protections offered by marriage and family law generally. 
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Further, it contends that the lack of legal protection for cohabitants is not the real 
problem: cohabitants who lose out in property disputes and wives who require the 
protection of family law are but symptoms of a much more serious problem, which is 
gendered disadvantage in relationships and in society generally. Extending a protective 
regime to cohabitants may treat the symptoms but will not really tackle the problem – 
rather, it will make it worse. 
 In stressing the inadequacies of property law, as exemplified by atrocity stories 
such as that of Mrs Burns, many family lawyers have failed to consider, on the one hand, 
how far women’s difficulties might be historically specific – that the circumstances and 
the law might be different now – or, on the other hand, that they might be due to some 
other factor – not the law itself, but the way it has been applied by male-dominated 
courts committed (however unconsciously) to preserving men’s economic power; and the 
fact that the same criticisms can be made of the ways that, historically and still today, 
property has been allocated on divorce. 
 In the past, many factors played into the courts’ hands in family home disputes to 
ensure that women were kept disempowered. First, homes were routinely conveyed into 
the man’s name; this ensured that a woman claiming a share had to take the complex, 
expensive and uncertain implied trust route. But well over 80 per cent of couples’ homes are 
now conveyed into joint names today. Second, the adoption of resulting trust rules, and even 
constructive trust rules in their narrower interpretation, ensured that women would 
always be disadvantaged, since their domestic responsibilities, low pay and/or exclusion 
from paid employment made them less able to make financial contributions to the 
home. Although women still do most domestic labour and earn less, on average, than 
men, very few women are unable to make financial contributions to the home today, and there are 
plenty of women – Ms Dowden and Ms Jones of recent case law being good examples – 
whose contributions were higher and financial resources better than their male partner’s. 
A financial contribution will guarantee a share in the home under the constructive trust 
rules. Today, moreover, those rules can be much more flexibly applied to include non-
financial contributions – and the courts are, if not yet free of gender bias, much less 
dominated by patriarchal ideologies than they used to be.  
Third, women’s ignorance of the law, trust in their men and the assumption that 
they would be supported for life in an era when divorce was still rare meant that they 
were often unprepared for what would happen when the relationship ended. While 
Britons remain notoriously ignorant of the law, the high divorce rate and widely-
publicised relationship break-ups ensure that women are less likely to be so starry-eyed 
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today. Finally, property law rules now aim to ensure that, on acquisition of a property, 
couples must discuss ownership and shares – and they will not be allowed to leave their 
name off the documents if there is a mortgage involved. My conclusion is that the female 
cohabitant of today is in a very different place from the vulnerable ‘Mrs Burns’ of the 
‘marriage protects’ imagination. This is yesterday’s problem and, like community of 
property in the 1980s, post-Boland, the proposal for family law protection is yesterday’s 
reform.100  
 In seeming contradiction of this confident assertion stands the Scottish case heard 
in the Supreme Court, Gow v Grant.101 This concerned a woman of 64 who moved, at his 
invitation, into the home of a widower of 58, and in so doing sold her flat, at his request, 
and agreed, again at his request, not to seek more work when her post came to an end. 
She used the proceeds of sale from her flat to pay debts and fund the couple’s ‘relatively 
extravagant’ lifestyle,102 including buying two timeshare weeks. The relationship ended 
after five years leaving Mr Grant with his £200,000 house and Mrs Gow with nothing. 
The case was heard under Scottish, not English, law, and Mrs Gow succeeded in 
obtaining compensation for incurring disadvantage under section 28 of the Family Law 
(Scotland) Act 2006, a measure which has no parallel in England and Wales.  
Family lawyers like Miles103 and Lady Hale herself have taken the lesson from this 
story that, as long as there are men like him and women who like her, a protective 
regime is needed, and have called for its extension to England and Wales. But the 
drawback of such proposals is that, as long as the law offers protection, there is no 
incentive for women to change their behaviour, take charge of their lives, negotiate fair 
and equal relationships and stop looking to a man or, failing the man, the law, to look 
after them.  
 
PROPOSALS 
It was not my intention in this article to demonstrate that the idea that ‘marriage 
protects’ in English law is a total myth or to deny that there are situations in which, in 
relation to property, an individual might be better off married. Rather, the article is a 
plea for the following: 
Greater accuracy and precision in family law accounts when they set out the property 
law principles applicable to cohabitants’ homes on relationship breakdown, so that the 
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normal and usual arrangement is explained first and the exceptional and difficult 
situations are described as such.  
Greater clarity about what usually happens in practice, not just in property law 
disputes but in divorce disputes over property, and to be upfront about the nature and 
limitations of marriage’s claimed protections. 
An end to family lawyers’ portrayal of cohabitation as a deficiency model and the 
patronising and pathologising of cohabitants in accounts where, for example, they 
are called ‘legally irrational’ or put into categories with labels such as ‘romantics’ and 
‘ideologues’.104 In relation to the first, I know many cohabitants who have made quite 
rational decisions to organise their property affairs outside marriage, preferring the 
certainty of property law to a judge’s notion of fairness based on some normative notion 
of how couples live. In relation to the second, contemporary representations of marriage 
as a benign institution that couples would sensibly embrace ignore its long and 
ignominious history of oppression and exploitation of women, features reflected in those 
very provisions for property division on divorce. Not to speak of the long and 
ignominious history of stigmatising unmarried people! What should be cause for 
celebration, especially for those of us who grew up in an era where the pressure to 
marry and the shame of spinsterhood blighted many women’s lives, is that ‘Cohabitation 
has become a normal part of the life course … Cohabitation is no longer seen as socially 
deviant’ (my emphasis).105  
Better conveyancing practice. It should be compulsory for co-ownership shares to be 
declared and for individuals to be separately advised when entering into a co-ownership 
arrangement (along the lines of the separate advice required for joint mortgages under 
Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2).106 Lady Hale called for mandatory declaration in 
Stack v Dowden,107 and the problem is not going to go away with the increasing delegation 
of conveyancing to unqualified staff in firms ‘instructed by lenders on a bulk basis’,108 
since lenders are not concerned with shares, all co-owners being jointly and separately 
liable for a mortgage. Such a requirement would oblige conveyancers to advise their 
clients properly, including explaining the effect of a joint tenancy on sale: yes, you are 
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effectively giving your partner a half share, as Douglas et al note,109 but this at least 
ensures that s/he will have something if the relationship ends. 
Better education of the general public about law. One of the conveyancing solicitors 
interviewed by Douglas et al said that couples wanted only the minimum of information: 
‘Anything more and I just see the eyes glaze over’.110 This patronising attitude, once 
characteristic of doctors’ interactions with patients but now abandoned in favour of 
encouraging us to take more control of our health, needs to go. Conveyancing law is, 
frankly, a great deal less difficult to understand than medicine and if we can master one, 
we can manage the other.   
A more urgent reason for change is the recent tendency noted by family lawyers 
for judges to treat separating spouses as autonomous individuals who must live with the 
consequences of choices they made during their marriage. Anne Barlow writes: 
Adult couple relationships are increasingly characterised as equal partnerships 
where the partners should be at liberty jointly to exercise their autonomy around 
decision-making on family issues. … Recent examples of this phenomenon 
include: recognition of enforceable pre-nuptial agreements; replacement of 
statutory child maintenance; strong regulatory encouragement of family 
mediation; and rejection of calls for family law regulation of cohabitant 
separation.111 
 
Some family lawyers endorse this shift; Ruth Deech, for instance, urges that 
What is needed is an end to discretion and the recognition of autonomy in 
contracts with the aim of reducing costs and promoting negotiation in a better 
spirit.112 
 
But the majority fear that an assumption of individual autonomy and ‘choice’ will have 
the effect of perpetuating male dominance in a society where women commonly have 
less bargaining power and fewer choices than their male partners. Feminists may indeed 
suspect – I do – that one reason it has been taken up with such enthusiasm is precisely 
because it restores the patriarchal status quo.  
If this trend continues, family law will lose much of its potential for protecting women, 
and education becomes even more crucial. The public need to be empowered to make 
informed decisions about property at the point when it matters – that is, on the 
acquisition of property rather than on sale. This education needs to come from accurate 
sources, which makes it even more important that family lawyers are clear about the 
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law, so that those who learn from their work do not get it wrong, as they so often do. 
And it needs to be presented in a way that is neither normative nor scaremongering and 
does not require reading through pages of legal detail (cf Advicenow). That is why 
conveyancing advice is so crucial: it forces couples to make choices together, instead of 
waiting for the right moment that might never come. 
Rejection of a family law-style protective regime for cohabitants. Although no one 
would disagree with the proposition that women in general continue to suffer financial 
disadvantage in society, which makes equal contributions to property difficult for many, 
the assumption of joint ownership of the family home goes a long way towards 
redressing the balance.  There are, moreover, plenty of women with equal or greater 
means than their male partners, as case law like Stack v Dowden shows. The problem with 
protective regimes of the sort proposed for cohabitants is that they tend to discourage 
further efforts within society towards gender equality or by individual women to achieve 
financial independence. For this reason I think it would be retrograde to impose on 
cohabitants the kind of legislative regime that exists in other jurisdictions or was 
proposed by the Law Commission in 2007.  
First, such a regime would perpetuate the entrenched cultural norm that women 
need and want protection, not just from the law, but from the men out of whose assets 
their financial compensation must come. It would reinforce an already existing 
impression that women are foolish, too trusting, or blinded by love, an impression 
strengthened by the traditional omission of any mention of the person protection is 
required from: that is, the man. It would not challenge the idea that women should be 
mainly responsible for domestic work and childcare, but rather would encourage it 
since, if they suffer disadvantage for making this ‘choice’, they will be compensated 
under the protective regime. The assumption that women will take this role would in 
turn perpetuate the privatisation of care, saving the state money and deflecting attention 
from measures that could really help women such as affordable childcare and family-
friendly work policies, not to speak of genuinely equal pay. This would then sustain the 
existing power structure in which men are dominant because, not having to deflect from 
paid employment to do this work, they are usually richer.  
Finally, as Bottomley put it, ‘reform which extends crucial aspects of our marriage 
law will lessen our choices about how we organise our domestic lives’.113 Conservative 
forces in society do not really want women to be independent; they want to see them 
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tied to men as breadwinners and providers, holding the family together. For women to 
be demonstrably able to cope on their own would render marriage, and even men (they 
fear), superfluous. In the family-law vision of society I have described, marriage risks 
becoming the status from which our rights are derived, like coverture in the past, 
suggesting that women (it is always the vulnerable woman we have in mind when 
speaking of marriage’s protection) should receive their protection in law from the fact of 
having husbands or male partners – a position against which feminists have been 
fighting for 200 years.  
 
 
